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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Case No. 900264-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
Priority No. 2

v.
JOSE RICHARD QUINTANA,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of attempted
aggravated robbery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-302 and 76-4-101 (1990), in the Third Judicial
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable
Leonard H. Russon, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction to

hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)
(Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court have jurisdiction to entertain
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea when defendant
failed to file his motion within the 30-day period mandated by
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1990)?

Although this issue was not

raised below, a jurisdictional question may be entertained at any
time during trial or on appeal. State v. Davenport, 30 Utah 2d
298, 517 P.2d 544, 545 n.2 (1973).

CONSTITUTIONAL. PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. S 77-13-6 (1990)
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at
any time prior to conviction.
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest amy be
withdrawn only upon good cause shown and
with leave of the court,
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty
or no contest is made by motion, and shall
be made within 30 days after the entry of
the plea.
(3) This section does not restrict the rights
of an imprisoned person under Rule 65B(i),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 29, 1987, defendant was charged with one
count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990), one count of possession of a
dangerous weapon by restricted person, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code .Ann. § 76-10-503 (1990) and as a habitual
criminal under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1990) (R. 19-21).

On

February 8, 1988, defendant entered pleas of not guilty to all
counts (R. 23).
On March 21, 1988, defendant withdrew his plea of not
guilty to count one and entered a plea of guilty to attempted
aggravated robbery, a second degree felony (transcript of guilty
plea hearing [hereinafter H T M ] at 4). As part of a plea
agreement, the State moved to dismiss the other two counts (T.
1).

The trial court accepted the plea, and defendant was

sentenced to a term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison on the attempted aggravated assault charge with an
enhancement of one year for the use of a firearm, said terms to
be served consecutively to the sentence he was currently serving
(T. 9, R. 29-30).
-2-

On August 11, 1989, defendant filed a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, stating that he did not enter it with
full knowledge if its consequences (R. 41). After a hearing on
defendant's motion, the trial court denied the motion (R. 55-57).
Defendant filed his notice of appeal on April 27, 1990 (R. 5859).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts pertinent to this case are stated in the
statement of the case, supra.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain
defendant's motion to withdraw his no contest plea because
defendant failed to file his motion within the 30-day period
mandated in Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1990).
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO
ENTERTAIN DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS
NO CONTEST PLEA BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO
FILE HIS MOTION WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD
MANDATED IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6 (1990).
On March 21, 1988, defendant entered a guilty plea to
the charge of attempted aggravated robbery (T. 4). At that time,
there was no statutory time limit placed on defendant for filing
a request to withdraw his plea.

However, Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-

6, the withdrawal of plea statute, was amended in 1989. As of
April 24, 1989, subsection (2)(b) of that statute reads:

"A

request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by
motion, and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the
plea."

Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on

August 11, 1989, nearly seventeen months after the entry of the
plea and four months after the amendment was adopted (R. 41). If
this amendment is applied retroactively, defendant was barred
from filing a motion to withdraw his plea, and the trial court
had no jurisdiction to hear the motion because it was untimely
filed.

Although this issue was not raised below, a question of

jurisdiction may be raised at any time.

See Olson v. Salt Lake

City School Dist., 724 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986); State v.
Davenport, 30 Utah 2d 298, 517 P.2d 544, 545 n.2 (1973).
The general rule of nonretroactivity is based upon the
notion that
[l]aws, whatever their form, which purport to
make innocent acts criminal after the event,
or to aggravate an offense, are harsh and
oppressive, and that the criminal quality
attributable to an act, either by the legal
definition of the offense or by the nature or
amount of the punishment imposed for its
commission, should not be altered by
legislative enactment, after the fact, to the
disadvantage of the accused.
Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170 (1925).

However, there is a

long-standing exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity.
[Procedural statutes enacted subsequent to
the initiation of a suit which do not
enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or
contractual rights apply not only to future
actions, but also to accrued and pending
actions as well. Petty v, Clark, 113 Utah
205, 192 P.2d 589 (1948); Boucofski v.
Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117 (1909).
State Department of Social Services v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000
(Utah 1982) (emphasis added).

A procedural change was defined in

Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884):
[A]Iterations which do not increase the
punishment, nor change the ingredients of the

offense or the ultimate facts necessary to
establish guilt, . . .—leaving untouched the
nature of the crime and the amount or degree
of proof essential to conviction—. . .
relate to modes of procedure only, in which
no one can be said to have a vested right,
and which the state, upon grounds of public
policy, may regulate at pleasure.
110 U.S. at 210 (emphasis added).

The 30-day requirement on a

motion to withdraw a plea contained in section 77-13-6(2)(b) has
no substantive effect on the crime with which a defendant was
charged.

Therefore, it is procedural and can be applied

retroactively.
In State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577 (Utah 1983), the Utah
Supreme Court addressed the issue of retroactivity of a statute
in the context of an amendment to a resentencing statute. There,
the defendant argued that since the amendment contained no
express language indicating its retroactive effect, it could only
be applied to crimes committed after its effective date.
Rejecting that argument, the Court stated that the defendant had
ignored the Court's "long-standing exception to the general rule
of nonretroactivity.

Remedial and procedural amendments apply to

accrued, pending, and future actions."

675 P.2d at 585 (citing

Department of Social Services v. Higgsf 656 P.2d at 1000-01).
This Court defined the term "accrued" in Gay Hill Field
Service v. Bd. of Review, 750 P.2d 606 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
There, it stated that "a cause of action 'accrues at the time it
becomes remediable in the courts.'"

750 P.2d at 609 (quoting

State Tax Comm'n v. Spanish Forkf 99 Utah 177, 181, 100 P.2d 575,
577 (1940) (where the Utah Supreme Court further explained that a
claim accrues "when the claim is in such a condition that the

courts can proceed and give judgment if the claim is
established.")).

Under that definition, and under the statute as

it read at the time of defendant's plea, defendant's option to
file a motion to withdraw his plea accrued at the time he entered
his plea.

Under the original version of the statute, defendant's

ability to remedy his plea by filing such a motion began at the
time of his plea and continued indefinitely.

The option of

withdrawing his plea had accrued to defendant.

The amendment

limiting the time period in which defendant could file a motion
to withdraw his plea was procedural.

Consequently, that

procedural amendment can and should be applied to defendant's
motion to withdraw his plea.
The amendment limiting the time in which a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea can be filed is in the nature of a statute
of limitations.

The Utah Supreme Court has stated:

[T]he law is well settled that statutes
affecting limitation may be amended and
shortened without impinging on any
constitutional rights of a party, provided
always that a sufficient period of grace is
allowed to enable a plaintiff to maintain his
cause of action if he will follow the new
law. . . .
Limitation statutes . . . are but
procedural matters and are not
constitutionally protected if they do not
adversely affect vested rights.
Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919, 920 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added).
While the Vealey court spoke of a grace period to allow a
plaintiff to maintain his cause of action, that exact proviso is
not required in all cases. Due process concerns which dictated a
grace period in the Vealey case have been provided for in the
amendment to the plea withdrawal statute.

The 1989 amendment to

section 77-13-6 provides that a prisoner is not precluded from
filing for postconviction relief under rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

See § 77-13-6(3).

That option is open for

defendant.
Because defendant failed to file a motion to withdraw
his plea within the mandated 30-day limit, defendant was
precluded from filing a motion to withdraw, and the trial court
had no jurisdiction to hear the motion.

Defendant is left with

the remedy provided for in the statute.

He may file a petition

for postconviction relief.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty
plea and affirm his conviction.
Respectfully submitted, this /7 ^day of March, 1991.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
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